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RECENT CASE: THE THIRD CIRCUIT HOLDS THAT
PENNSYLVANIA CANNOT APPLY ITS BALLOT ACCESS LAW
TO TWO SPECIFIC CANDIDATES BUT FAILS TO RULE
ON THE LAW'S OVERALL CONSTITUTIONALITY
I.

INTRODUCTION

Pennsylvania's election code requires candidates for public office to
pay a filing fee before their names are placed on the general election ballot.1 Specifically, the code provides that "[e]ach person filing any nomination petition shall pay for each petition, at the time of filing, a filing fee
... and no nomination petition shall be accepted or filed, unless and
until such filing fee is paid." 2 When the state collects the monies from
such fees, the monies become part of Pennsylvania's general treasury. 3
4
Pennsylvania's ballot access law is not unique among the states.
Many states currently charge candidates fees to have their names placed
1. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 25, § 2873(b.1) (West 1994) (requiring persons filing
nomination petitions to pay filing fee at time petition is filed).
2. Id. (stating that potential candidates must pay filing fee to have name
placed on ballot).
3. See id. (stating that all filing fees shall become part of general fund).
4. See ALA. CODE § 17-16-15 (1975) (stating that political party's governing
body may require persons desiring to become candidates for political office to pay
fees); ALASKA STAT. § 15.25.050(a) (Michie 2002) (requiring candidates to pay
nonrefundable filing fee to be placed on primary election ballot); CAL. ELEC. CODE
§ 8104 (West 1994) (stating that candidates for judicial offices or county offices
must pay filing fee equaling one percent of annual salary for position they wish to
obtain); HAW. REv. STAT. ANN. § 12-6(b) (Michie 1993) (requiring candidates to
pay filing fee to be placed on primary election ballot); IDAHO CODE § 34-605(4)
(Michie 2001) (requiring candidates to pay $300 filing fee to be placed on ballot
for House of Representatives); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 25-206(a) (2000) (stating that
candidates must pay fee equaling one percent of annual salary for position they
wish to obtain); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 118.255(1) (Michie Supp. 2003) (requiring
candidates to pay filing fees to be placed on primary election ballot); LA. REv.
STAT. ANN. § 18:464 (West Supp. 2003) (same); MD. ANN. CODE art. EL, § 5-401 (a)(b) (2002) (stating that persons who file certificates of candidacy must pay filing
fee at time certificate of candidacy is filed); MINN. STAT. § 204B.11 (Supp. 2003)
(stating that candidates who file affidavit of candidacy must pay filing fee for office
sought); Miss. CODE ANN. § 23-15-297 (2003) (requiring candidates to pay filing
fee upon entering race for party nomination); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 115.357.1 (West
2003) (requiring candidates for federal, state or county office to pay filing fee
before filing declaration of candidacy); MONT. CODE ANN. § 13-10-202 (2003) (stating that candidates running for offices with annual salaries of more than $2,500
must pay fee equaling one percent of total annual salary, but stating that no filing
fee is required for offices receiving no salary); NEB. REv. STAT. § 32-608 (1998)
(stating that candidates must pay filing fees before filing for office); NEV. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 293.193 (Michie 2002) (imposing fees in order to file declarations of
candidacy); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 655:19, 655:19-c (1996) (stating that candidates must pay mandatory filing fees at time declaration of candidacy is filed).
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on the primary or general election ballots. 5 Some of these states provide
waivers for those who cannot afford the fees. 6 Others provide an alternative method for obtaining ballot access, such as a voter signature requirement. 7 Pennsylvania's law, however, does not discuss either the possibility
of a waiver or an alternative means of ballot access. 8
This Article examines the Third Circuit's analysis and holding in Belitskus v. Pizzingrilli9 in light of U.S. Supreme Court decisions discussing the
constitutionality of ballot access laws.1 0 Moreover, this Article argues that
although the Third Circuit properly applied Supreme Court ballot access
principles to invalidate Pennsylvania's filing fee requirement as applied to
two specific plaintiffs, it improperly failed to strike the statute down as
unconstitutional on its face." Part II of this Article summarizes U.S. Supreme Court cases, which addressed the equal protection concerns raised
by filing fee requirements. 12 Part III describes the facts and procedural
history of Belitskus.13 Part IV outlines the Third Circuit's examination of
Pennsylvania's filing fee requirement and its determination that the filing
fees were unconstitutional as applied to two specific plaintiffs.' 4 Part V
5. See Mark R. Brown, PopularizingBallotAccess: The FrontDoor to Election Reform,

58 OHio ST. L.J. 1281, 1281 (1997) (noting that most states impose ballot access
restrictions but arguing that ballot access restrictions should be reduced).
6. See ALA. CODE § 17-16-15 (stating that parties can only require potential
candidates to pay filing fees if they are able to pay such fees); Ar.Asi.A STAT.
§ 15.25.050(b) (stating that indigent persons may file statements of indigency in
lieu of paying filing fee); MD. ANN. CODE art. EL, § 5-401 (c) (stating that filing fees
are waived if potential candidate demonstrates inability to pay such fees); Mo.
ANN. STAT. § 115.357.3 (stating that filing fees are waived if person files declaration
of inability to pay with declaration of candidacy); NEB. REv. STAT. § 32-608 (stating
that filing fee is not required if potential candidate's "income and other resources
for maintenance are . . . insufficient for meeting the cost of his or her

requirements").
7. See CAL.ELEC. CODE § 8104 (noting that candidates may gather signatures
in lieu of paying filing fee); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-6(b) (stating that indigent
persons can forego paying filing fee by presenting petition signed by one-half of
one percent of total registered voters in particular district); MINN. STAT. § 204B.11
(stating that candidates may present petitions signed by registered voters instead of
paying filing fee).
8. See Belitskus v. Pizzingfilli, 343 F.3d 632, 636 (3d Cir. 2003) (noting that
Pennsylvania's filing fee law contains no waiver provision and does not provide for
any alternative means of ballot access).
9. 343 F.3d 632 (3d Cir. 2003).
10. For a discussion of Third Circuit's analysis and holding in Belitskus, see
infra notes 57-85 and accompanying text.
11. For an explanation of why the Third Circuit should have utilized the constitutional principles set forth by the U.S. Supreme Court to invalidate Pennsylvania's ballot access scheme, see infra notes 86-111 and accompanying text.
12. For a discussion of U.S. Supreme Court cases examining the constitutionality of filing fee requirements, see infra notes 17-38 and accompanying text.
13. For a discussion of the background and procedural history of Belitskus, see
infra 39-56 and accompanying text.
14. For a discussion of the Third Circuit's analysis and holding in Belitskus, see
infra notes 57-85 and accompanying text.
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argues that the Third Circuit should have also declared Pennsylvania's filPart VI discusses the adverse
ing fee law constitutionally invalid. 15 Lastly,
16
impacts of the Third Circuit's decision.
II.

THE SUPREME COURT'S EXAMINATION OF IMANDATORY FILING FEES

Filing fee requirements have the effect of making some level of wealth
17
Accordingly, these fees
a prerequisite for running for political office.
impede the electoral process because many qualified potential candidates
18
This leads to
are unable to pay the fee and thus cannot run for office.
voters sometimes being unable to choose the person they desire for a particular political office. 19 As a result, filing fees raise a number of equal
protection concerns. 20 The U.S. Supreme Court has addressed these con2
cerns in two principal cases. '
In the first case, Bullock v. Carter,2 2 the Court struck down a Texas law
requiring candidates who wanted to be placed on the state's primary election ballot to pay exorbitant filing fees. 23 The Court reasoned that the
Texas law not only infringed on the equal protection rights of individual
candidates, but also interfered with voters' ability to support candidates of
their choosing. 24 Thus, the Court determined that such cases deserve a
heightened level of scrutiny, though not strict scrutiny. 25 The Court ulti15. For an explanation of why the Third Circuit should have utilized the constitutional principles set forth by the U.S. Supreme Court to invalidate Pennsylvania's ballot access scheme, see infra notes 86-111 and accompanying text.
16. For a discussion of the impact of the Third Circuit's holding in Belitskus,
see infra 112-18 and accompanying text.
17. See Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 149 (1972) ("By requiring candidates
to shoulder the costs of conducting primary elections through filing fees and by
providing no reasonable alternative means of access to the ballot, the State of
Texas has erected a system that utilizes the criterion of ability to pay as a condition
).
to being on the ballot ....
18. See id. (acknowledging that imposing filing fees without providing any alternative method of ballot access excludes some qualified candidates from running
for office).
19. See id. (noting that filing fees deny voters ability to vote for their candidates of choice).
20. See Brown, supra note 5, at 1287 (stating that because ballot access and
voting are fundamental rights, restrictions on either can create equal protection
problems).
21. See id. (noting that Supreme Court discussed equal protection issues surrounding mandatory filing fees in two principal cases).
22. 405 U.S. 134 (1972).
23. See id. at 149 (determining that Texas's filing fee system violates Equal
Protection Clause).
24. See id. at 144 (stating that Texas's filing fee system limits voters' ability to
vote for their preferred candidates).
25. See id. (holding that Texas's filing fee system "must be 'closely scrutinized'
and found reasonably necessary to the accomplishment of legitimate state objectives in order to pass constitutional muster"); see also Matthew W. Daus, Are Politicians a Protected Class?: The Constitutionalityof "ReasonableAccess" Media Rights Under
the CommunicationsAct, 6 CoMMLAw CONSPECTUS 173, 177 (1998) (stating that Bul-
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mately invalidated the Texas law because the state was unable tojustify the
law as "reasonably necessary to the accomplishment of legitimate state
objectives. ' 26 The Court recognized that states have legitimate interests in
both limiting the number of candidates on the ballot and eliminating frivolous or fraudulent candidates. 27 Nevertheless, the Court stated that
Texas's failure to provide potential candidates with a reasonable alternative means of ballot access rendered the filing fee requirement constitu28
tionally invalid.
Only two years later, the Supreme Court again addressed the equal
protection problems generated by a state imposing filing fees on potential
candidates in Lubin v. Panish.29 In Lubin, the Court struck down a California law requiring candidates who wished to be placed on the state's House
primary election ballot to pay very modest filing fees. 30 The Court again
acknowledged that states have a legitimate interest in limiting ballots and
preventing frivolous candidacy. 31 The Court stated, however, that these
interests must be achieved without unnecessarily burdening candidates'
right to access the electoral process and voters' right to choose their preferred candidate.3 2 Therefore, the Court held that even though California only required modest filing fees, the state's failure to provide any
33
alternative means for ballot access rendered the statute unconstitutional.
Bullock and Lubin established an analytical framework for examining
challenges to a state's imposition of ballot access filing fees. 34 First, states
lock Court did not apply strict scrutiny or rational basis test, but instead used close
scrutiny to examine Texas's filing fee requirement).
26. See Bullock, 405 U.S. at 149 (determining that Texas had not sufficiently
justified its ballot access requirements).
27. See id. at 145 (acknowledging that states have legitimate interests in regulating number of people on ballot and preventing frivolous candidacies).
28. See id. at 149 (ruling that because Texas imposed mandatory filing fees
without providing reasonable alternative means of ballot access, its filing fee system
was invalid).
29. 415 U.S. 709, 713-18 (1974) (discussing application of Equal Protection
Clause to voting and ballot-access arena).
30. See id. at 710 (addressing constitutionality of California's statute requiring
payment of filing fee to be placed on primary election ballot).
31. See id. at 714 (discussing California's articulated reasons for imposing
mandatory filing fees).
32. See id. at 716 (stating that states must achieve their interests without interfering with party's or candidate's political opportunities).
33. See id. at 718 (holding that states cannot require filing fees without also
providing reasonable alternative means of ballot access).
34. See Brown, supra note 5, at 1294-95 (discussing constitutional limits established by Bullock and Lubin). Based on the constitutional principles that emerged
from Bullock and Lubin, several lower courts have also invalidated state filing fee
requirements. See Robinson v. Pottinger, 512 F.2d 775, 777 (5th Cir. 1975) (affirming district court's conclusion that Alabama's filing fee requirements violated
Equal Protection Clause); see also Brown v. N.C. Bd. of Educ., 394 F. Supp. 359, 362
(W.D.N.C. 1975) (holding that North Carolina's filing fee system was unconstitutional because it failed to provide any reasonable alternative means of ballot access); W. Va. Libertarian Party v. Manchin, 270 S.E.2d 634, 640 (W.V. 1980)
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cannot utilize filing fees as the sole test of a candidate's seriousness in
pursuing election to a particular office. 35 Second, states can use filing fees
to limit the number of candidates listed on the ballot or to screen for
fraudulent and frivolous candidacies as long as the state provides an alter36
native method for accessing the ballot._
Finally, a state's alternative to its
filing fee requirement must be "reasonable."3 7 In sum, a court will uphold
a state's filing fee requirement as reasonably necessary for the achievement of legitimate interests if the state provides a "reasonable" alternative
38
to fee payment.
III.

BELITSKUS V. PZZINCRILLT

In November of 2000, John Stith wanted to run as the Green Party
candidate in the election for state representative of the 77th District.3 9 To
have his name placed on the ballot, Pennsylvania required him to pay a
$100 filing fee. 40 At the time he was required to pay this fee, however, his
take-home pay was approximately $1,200 per month and his living expenses were approximately $1,073 per month. 4 ' Further, his personal
(determining that West Virginia's filing fee requirement was unconstitutional because it failed to provide any reasonable alternative means of ballot access). Other
courts have applied these principles and upheld the state's filing fee requirement.
See, e.g.,
Green v. Mortham, 989 F. Supp. 1451, 1462 (M.D. Fla. 1998) (determining
that Florida's filing fee system did not violate Fourteenth Amendment because it
allowed candidates to forego paying fees by collecting reasonable number of voter
signatures).
35. See Brown, supra note 5, at 1294-95 (discussing constitutional limits established by Bullock and Lubin).
36. See id. (discussing constitutional limits established by Bullock and Lubin).
37. See id. (discussing constitutional limits established by Bullock and Lubin).
The Supreme Court has not explicitly stated what constitutes a "reasonable alternative" method of ballot access. See id. at 1292-93 (arguing that alternatives that are
overly demanding, such as requiring 8,000 voter signatures, should raise constitutional concerns). Despite the Court's failure to define "reasonable alternative,"
some lower courts have upheld state filing fee requirements by determining that
the state provided potential candidates with a reasonable alternative means of ballot access. See, e.g., Andress v. Reed, 880 F.2d 239, 242 (9th Cir. 1989) (affirming
district court's holding that because California permitted candidates to forgo paying filing fees by gathering 100,000 voter signatures in sixty days, California's ballot
access law was constitutionally valid); Green, 989 F. Supp. at 1462 (holding that
Florida's filing fee system did not violate Fourteenth Amendment because it allowed candidates to forego paying fees by collecting reasonable number of voter
signatures).
38. See Brown, supra note 5, at 1295 (arguing that even small fee requirements
are not saved from constitutional invalidity by unreasonable alternatives such as
excessive signature requirements).
39. See Belitskus v. Pizzingrilli, 343 F.3d 632, 637 (3d Cir. 2003) (discussing
factual background).
40. See id. (discussing factual background).
41. See id. (describing Plaintiff Stith's financial situation at time he would have
been required to pay filing fee).
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bank account balance was only $1,500 dollars and his liabilities included
42
$3,500 in credit card debt and $40,000 in student loans.
Similarly, Thomas Linzey wanted to run as a Green Party candidate in
the November 2000 election for attorney general. 4 3 To have his name
placed on the ballot, the state required him to pay a $200 filing fee. 4 4 His
gross income in 2000, however, was only $4,611 and his average monthly
45
living expenses totaled $380.
Based on the hardship suffered by Stith and Linzey, the Pennsylvania
Green Party, on July 24, 2000, instituted an action against the Pennsylvania
secretary of state pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that the filing fees
violated the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause. 4" The
Green Party argued that because many of its members "are drawn from
the less affluent segment of the Pennsylvania community," continued application of the filing fees would cause many of its candidates to incur a
47
financial hardship.
On July 28, 2000, the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of
Pennsylvania granted a preliminary injunction as to Stith and all other
qualified candidates unable to pay the required filing fees. 48 The injunction stated that such candidates must be provided "an alternative measure
or measures for gaining access to the ballot ....-49 In accordance with
this injunction, the state offered Stith and Linzey exemptions from the
fees if they presented affidavits stating that they could not pay without

42. See id. (describing Plaintiff Stith's account balance and outstanding debt).
43. See id. (discussing factual background).
44. See id. (discussing factual background).
45. See id. (describing Plaintiff Linzey's financial situation at time he would
have been required to pay filing fee).
46. See id. at 638 (stating that Pennsylvania Green Party instituted action on
behalf of Plaintiffs Stith and Linzey). The action was also filed on behalf of Pennsylvania State University student William Donovan. See id. at 637 (discussing third
plaintiff aggrieved by Pennsylvania's filing fee requirement). Donovan was a registered voter and Green Party supporter. See id. (describing third plaintiff aggrieved
by Pennsylvania's filing fee requirement). The district court determined that Donovan was not entitled to relief and granted the state summary judgment as to his
claims. See id. at 638 (discussing procedural history). Donovan has since moved
from Pennsylvania and has not indicated that he plans to return. See id. at 637
(stating reasons for not examining Plaintiff Donovan's claim on appeal). Consequently, the Third Circuit determined that his claim was moot and, thus, the court
lacked jurisdiction to address the merits of his appeal. See id. at 648-49 (determining that Donovan did not fall into any mootness exception because he no longer
resides in Pennsylvania).
47. Id. at 637-38 (discussing Green Party's argument against Pennsylvania's
imposition of mandatory filing fees).
48. See id. at 638 (discussing procedural history).
49. Id. (quoting district court's preliminary injunction).
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suffering financial hardship.5" Stith and Linzey complied, and the state
51
placed their names on the November 2000 ballot.

On August 20, 2001, the district court granted a permanent injunction enjoining the state from requiring Stith to pay the filing fee. 52 More
broadly, the district court prohibited the state from "requiring candidates
to pay a filing fee [that] they cannot afford."5 3 The court determined,
however, that Linzey had not demonstrated that he was unable to afford
the fee. 54 Nevertheless, the district court stated that the injunction enabled Linzey to attempt to prove at a later date that he could not afford the
56
fee. 55 Both parties appealed the district court's order.

IV.

THE THIRD CIRCUIT'S ANALYSIS

The Third Circuit affirmed the district court's order as to Stith, but it
vacated the injunction and remanded the case. 57 Writing for the court,
Judge Jane Roth began by noting that although Article I, Section 4 of the
Constitution gives individual states the power to regulate both congressional elections and their own elections, such regulations must be consis58
tent with the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause.
Accordingly, states may constitutionally limit election ballot access
through filing fees or other means so long as they do so in accordance
with equal protection principles. 59 Judge Roth outlined the Supreme
Court's analyses in Bullock and Lubin, noting that these cases provide the
framework for examining an equal protection challenge to Pennsylvania's
filing fee requirement.6 0
Against the backdrop of these two cases, the court relied on the balancing test previously employed by the Supreme Court to determine what
level of scrutiny was appropriate for examining Pennsylvania's ballot access law. 6 ' This test requires that courts balance the ballot access law's
50. See id. (noting that Pennsylvania complied with district court's preliminary
injunction).
51. See id. (stating that Plaintiff Stith's and Plaintiff Linzey's names appeared
on November 2000 election ballot).
52. See id. (discussing procedural history).
53. Id. at 638 (quoting district court's permanent injunction).
54. See id. (explaining that district court did not enjoin state from applying
filing fee to Plaintiff Linzey).
55. See id. at 637 (acknowledging that district court denied motion to amend
permanent injunction to include Plaintiff Linzey).
56. See id. at 638 (discussing procedural history).
57. See id. at 651 (stating court's holding).
58. See id. at 641 (discussing states' power to regulate elections).
59. See id. at 642 (recognizing that states may limit ballot access to concentrate
voter attention on fewer candidates).
60. See id. (describing two cases where Supreme Court held filing fees to be
unconstitutional).
61. See id. at 643-47 (applying Supreme Court's two-step balancing test). The
Supreme Court first developed this balancing test in Anderson v. Celebrezze. 460 U.S.
789, 789 (1983) (developing balancing test for determining appropriate level of
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burdens against the state's asserted justifications for the law. 62 The court
noted that all ballot access restrictions at least incidentally affect the people's right to vote and their right to freely associate. 63 Nevertheless, it
stated that "the mere fact that a State's system 'creates barriers ... tending
to limit the field of candidates from which voters might choose . . . does

not of itself compel close scrutiny."
A.

64

The Burdens That Filing Fee Requirements Impose on
Candidates' ConstitutionalRights

In applying the first step of the Supreme Court's balancing test, the
Third Circuit discussed the burdens that the filing fees placed on the
plaintiffs' constitutional rights. 65 The court concluded that Stith's and
Linzey's "difficulty in raising the funds to pay the required fees, looked at
in light of the [candidates'] total assets and liabilities ....

[was] sufficient

to satisfy this [step]."66 In other words, potential candidates should not be
required to deplete campaign funds or to utilize personal funds, which are
necessary for payment of living expenses and prior debts. 6 7 Moreover, the
court acknowledged the Supreme Court's conclusion in Bullock that a severe burden is placed on an indigent candidate's rights when states require filing fees without providing any alternative means of ballot access. 68
The fact that the fee amounts were small made no difference to the court
scrutiny to apply in ballot access cases). In Anderson, the Court determined that
courts must weigh certain factors before deciding whether a ballot access restriction is constitutional. See id. (providing ballot access analysis). First, a court must
consider the law's burden on the challenger's First and Fourteenth Amendment
rights. See id. ("[A reviewing court] must first consider the character and magnitude of the asserted injury to the [plaintiff's] rights protected by the First and
Fourteenth Amendments."). Second, a court must examine the state's asserted
justifications for the law's burdens. See id. ("[A reviewing court] must identify and
evaluate the precise interests put forward by the State as justifications for the burden imposed by its law."). Once the court balances all factors, it can determine
whether the challenged law is constitutional. See id. (stating that courts must balance ballot access restriction's burden on plaintiff's rights against state's asserted
justification for restriction).
62. See Anderson, 460 U.S. at 789 (developing test for determining appropriate
level of scrutiny courts should use to examine ballot access law).
63. See Belitskus, 343 F.3d at 643 (quoting Council of Alternative Political Parties v. Hooks, 179 F.3d 64, 70 (3d Cir. 1999)); see also Brown, supra note 5, at 1316
(noting that higher filing fees decrease likelihood that primaries will be contested,
and uncontested races produce little or no voter turnout).
64. Belitskus, 343 F.3d at 643 (quoting Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 143
(1972)).
65. See id. at 644-45 (examining burdens Pennsylvania's mandatory filing fee
placed on plaintiffs' constitutional rights).
66. Id. at 644 (concluding that plaintiffs met first step of balancing test by
demonstrating that paying filing fee would cause them financial hardship).
67. See id. (stating that because plaintiffs would have to deplete campaign
funds or use needed personal expenses to pay filing fee, paying such fee would
cause them financial hardship).
68. See id. (discussing Bullock Court's conclusions).
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because even minimal fees create barriers to some classes of persons aspiring to be placed on the ballot. 69 The court concluded that Pennsylvania's
fee requirement severely burdened the plaintiffs' rights because it failed to
70
provide alternative means of ballot access.
B.

Pennsylvania'sJustificationsfor the Burdens Its FilingFee Requirement
Imposes on Candidates' Rights

In applying the second and final step of the Supreme Court's balancing test, the court discussed the state's asserted justifications for the law's
burdens. 7 1 Because the law's burden on the plaintiffs' rights was deemed
severe, the court reasoned that the law must be "narrowly drawn to advance a state interest of compelling importance." 72 The state's first justification for the fees was that they limited the number of candidates
permitted on the ballot, thereby allowing ballot access only for serious
candidates. 73 The court concluded that the state's law was not narrowly
drawn for this purpose because other means existed for ensuring that only
qualified and serious candidates were placed on the ballot.7 4 The court
acknowledged that limiting the number of candidates might be "of compelling importance," but ultimately determined that imposing signature
requirements on all candidates was a more appropriate method for pro75
tecting that interest.
Additionally, the state asserted that it had an interest in defraying
election costs. 76 This assertion, however, directly contradicted the Supreme Court's holding in Bullock that candidates do not have to pay their
pro rata share of election costs. 7 7 Also, the state did not use the filing fees
to cover election costs, for it instead deposited the fees directly into its
general treasury fund. 78 Thus, the court held that the state's interest in
defraying election costs was not "of compelling importance," and the
69. See id. at 645 (rejecting state's argument that its required fee is too small
to warrant heightened scrutiny).
70. See id. (determining that plaintiffs' constitutional rights were severely burdened by imposition of filing fee requirement).
71. See id. at 645-47 (applying second step of Supreme Court's balancing test).
72. Id. at 645 (quoting Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 434 (1992)).
73. See id. at 646 (examining state's first asserted reason for imposing
mandatory filing fees).
74. See id. (rejecting state's first asserted reason for imposing mandatory filing
fees).
75. See id. (declaring that state had less restrictive means of effectuating its
interests).
76. See id. (examining state's second justification for imposing mandatory filing fees).
77. See id. (rejecting state's second asserted justification for imposing
mandatory filing fees).
78. See id. at 646-47 (reasoning that state's asserted justification was not compelling and, in any event, state's means were not narrowly tailored to effectuate its
interests).
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means employed by the law were not narrowly drawn to achieve this
79
interest.
C.

The Third Circuit's Failure to Rule on the Overall Constitutionality of
Pennsylvania'sFilingFee Requirement

Although the Third Circuit concluded that the state did not have any
narrowly drawn interest of compelling importance to support its filing fee
requirement, the court refused to declare the ballot access scheme unconstitutional on its face.8 0 Moreover, the court ruled that the provision of
the district court's injunction that enjoined the state from applying the
filing fee to all candidates who cannot afford to pay the fee was unnecessarily broad. 8 1 The Third Circuit determined that the district court should
have limited the scope of the injunction to prohibiting the state from applying the fee to Stith and Linzey during this election and future elections
where they demonstrate similar financial hardship.8 2 It then struck the
rest of the language from the order.8 3 Finally, the court suggested that
the Pennsylvania legislature should amend the election code in accordance with Bullock, Lubin and the Supreme Court's other ballot access
cases. 8 4 Thus, although the Third Circuit acknowledged that Penn79. See id. (concluding that state's second asserted justification for imposing
mandatory filing fees did not provide sufficient basis for upholding constitutionality of filing fees).
80. See id. at 650 (refusing to strike down ballot access scheme as unconstitutional on its face).
81. See id. (concluding that scope of district court's injunction was overly
broad).
82. See id. (examining scope of district court's injunction).
83. See id. (concluding that district court's injunction included unnecessary
provisions).
84. See id. ("[T]he vagueness and uncertainty of which the Commonwealth
complains in challenging the scope of the District Court's injunction, as well as the
need for such injunctions in the first instance, could be cured by simply amending
the election code to comply with the Supreme Court's ballot access jurisprudence."). In addition to examining the constitutionality of filing fee requirements,
the Supreme Court has also addressed the constitutionality of other ballot access
restrictions. See, e.g.,
Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428 (1992) (examining constitutionality of Hawaii's prohibition on write-in voting). In Burdick, the Court addressed whether Hawaii had infringed on voters' First and Fourteenth
Amendment rights by failing to permit them to write in votes for candidates not
appearing on the election ballot. See id. at 432-42 (examining constitutionality of
Hawaii's prohibition on write-in voting). The Court began by stating that it must
weigh the election law's burden on the plaintiffs First and Fourteenth Amendment rights against Hawaii's articulated justifications for the election law's burden.
See id. at 434 (quoting Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 789 (1993)). The
Court acknowledged that the state's election law impacted the right to vote, but
stated that "it can hardly be said that the laws at issue here unconstitutionally limit
access to the ballot by party or independent candidates or unreasonably interfere
with the right of voters to associate and have candidates of their choice placed on
the ballot." Id. (recognizing that Hawaii's election law undoubtedly impacts voting
rights, but that impact did not rise to level of unconstitutional interference). Further, the Court noted that although the law does not permit write-in voting, it does
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sylvania's ballot access law did not conform to Supreme Court precedent
on what is constitutional in the ballot access context, it failed to use this
85
case to declare the law constitutionally invalid.
V.

A

DEVIATION FROM BULLOCK AND LUBIN:

No

FACIAL INVALIDITY

In holding that the district court's injunction should have enjoined
Pennsylvania from applying the filing fee requirement to only Stith and
Linzey, the Third Circuit improperly refused to strike down Pennsylvania's
filing fee requirement as unconstitutional on its face.8 6 While the court
correctly utilized the ballot access principles extracted from Bullock and
Lubin to invalidate the statute's application to Stith and Linzey, it should
have used the same reasoning to strike down the statute altogether.8

7

In-

stead, it simply suggested that the Pennsylvania legislature exercise its
88
power and amend the statute.
It was improper for the court to place responsibility on Pennsylvania's
legislature for fixing the filing fee requirement's constitutional
problems. 89 According to the principles set forth in Marbury v. Madison,90
Article III, Section 2 of the U.S. Constitution implicitly gives the judiciary
provide voters' preferred candidates with three easy methods of appearing on the
ballot. See id. at 435-37 (noting that candidates can have their names placed on
ballot (1) by filing petition signed by specified number of registered voters, (2) by
being member of established party that has qualified by petition in previous three
elections or (3) by asking to be placed on nonpartisan ballot). Finally, the Court
considered Hawaii's asserted justifications for its prohibition on write-in voting and
concluded that they sufficiently outweigh the very minor burden the prohibition
placed on voters. See id. at 43940 (discussing Hawaii's articulated justifications for
its election law). Thus, the Court concluded that Hawaii's election code imposes a
reasonable burden on voters' rights and is, therefore, constitutional. See id. at 441
(stating Court's holding).
85. See Belitskus, 343 F.3d at 651 (acknowledging that continued case-by-case
analysis of challenges to Pennsylvania's mandatory filing fee does not serve interests of state, candidates or voters, but stating that state legislature should resolve
this problem).
86. See id.(noting that problems will arise with continued case-by-case analysis
of challenges to Pennsylvania's ballot access law, but refusing to declare law constitutionally invalid).
87. See id. at 650 (holding that district court's injunction should have only
prohibited state from applying filing fee requirement to Plaintiffs Stith and
Linzey).
88. See id. at 650-51 (arguing that problems created by mandatory filing fees
should be resolved by state's legislature).
89. See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION:
STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY

1179 (3d ed. 2001) (stating that

Articles I, II and III of Constitution create "an interactive regime of law implementation, rather than one where Congress passes statutes and everyone else does what
Congress wants"); see also Paul Brest, The Conscientious Legislator's Guide to Constitutional Interpretation, 27 STAN. L. RE'. 585, 587 (1975) (noting that many legislators
assume their job is to make policy without considering questions of
constitutionality).
90. 5 U.S. 137 (1803).
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the power to determine what is and is not constitutional. 9 1 This means
that the judiciary is not simply an agent of the legislature, but instead plays
a principal role in statutory implementation. 9 2 As a coordinate branch of
government, the judiciary shares with the legislature the responsibility of
imposing substantive preferences on a statutory scheme. 93 Further, the
judiciary is principally responsible for protecting and upholding the Constitution. 94 Thus, when a court invalidates a statute that it determines to
be unconstitutional, it is not usurping the legislature's power; the court is
simply exercising its judicial responsibility.9 5 Therefore, when a court determines that a particular law violates the Constitution, it should
96
intervene.

In Belitskus, the Third Circuit should have struck down Pennsylvania's
filing fee requirement as unconstitutional on its face because the Supreme
Court has invalidated statutes restricting ballot access when the statutes
provide no alternative method of ballot access. 97 In Bullock, for instance, a
candidate who wished to run for the office of county commissioner in the
Democratic primary challenged Texas's filing fee requirement after he
was unable to pay the $1,424.60 assessment required to be placed on the
ballot.9 8 A second candidate challenged the law after he was not placed
on the primary ballot as a candidate for county judge because he could
not pay the $6,300 assessment. 9 A third candidate also challenged the fee
because he was unable to run for the general land office because he did
not submit the required $1,000 fee. 100 The Supreme Court examined the
harms suffered by these three individuals and ultimately held that the
91. See generally id. (holding that power to determine what is and is not constitutional resides in judiciary).
92. See ESKRIDGE, supra note 89, at 1179 (arguing that courts may play principal role rather than act as agent in statutory implementation).
93. See id. (recognizing thatjudiciary may be considered coordinate branch of
government, not agent of Congress).
94. See Marbury, 5 U.S. at 141 (stating that it isjudiciary's responsibility to state
what law is); see also Brest, supra note 89, at 588 (acknowledging thatjudiciary's role
is constitutional interpreter, but arguing that because courts sometimes lack capacity to review all aspects of legislative decisions, Constitution must also be applied by
legislators themselves).
95. See Brest, supra note 89, at 587-88 (stating that one argument supporting
judicial review of legislative decisions is that in many instances constitutional
problems are not apparent until after statute is implemented).
96. See id. at 587 (urging courts to strike down statutes that violate
Constitution).
97. See Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 149 (1972) (holding that Texas's filing
fee requirement was unconstitutional because it failed to provide any alternative
method of ballot access); see also Lubin v. Panish, 415 U.S. 709, 718 (1974) (holding that California's filing fee requirement was unconstitutional because it did not
provide any alternative method of ballot access).
98. See Bullock, 405 U.S. at 135 (describing factual background).
99. See id. (describing factual background).
100. See id. (describing factual background).
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Texas law was constitutionally invalid. 1 1 The Court reasoned that the
state's failure to establish any alternative method for candidates to gain
ballot access had caused wealth to become a prerequisite for candidacy,
denying some voters the opportunity to vote for their preferred candidate.1 02 Therefore, when considering the burdens that the Texas filing
fee requirement imposed on three specific candidates, the Supreme Court
concluded that the law itself violated the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.10 3 In the present case, the Third Circuit failed
104
to follow the Supreme Court's lead and take this final analytical step.
The Supreme Court's holding in Lubin further supports the conclusion that the Third Circuit was incorrect in failing to rule on the overall
constitutionality of Pennsylvania's filing fee law.' 0 5 The filing fee at issue
in Lubin was more comparable to Pennsylvania's fee requirement.1 0 6
There, a candidate challenged California's filing fee statute because he
was unable to pay the $701.60 necessary to be placed on the ballot in the
primary election for the position of county supervisor.' 0 7 The Court ruled
that even statutes that do not involve filing fees that are "so patently exclusionary as to violate traditional equal protection concepts" should be invalidated if they fail to provide for alternative means of ballot access.' 08
Here, again the Court used one candidate's deprivation of equal protection rights to hold that the state statute on its face was unconstitutional.10 9
101. See id. at 149 (concluding that Texas's filing fee system was
unconstitutional).
102. See id. ("By requiring candidates to shoulder the costs of conducting primary elections through filing fees and by providing no reasonable alternative
means of access to the ballot, the State of Texas has erected a system that utilizes
the criterion of ability to pay as a condition to being on the ballot ....."); see also

Brown, supra note 5, at 1309 ("To the extent that ballot access restrictions allow
some, but not others, to run for office, they may cause debilitating inequalities.").
103. See Bullock, 405 U.S. at 149 (holding that Texas's filing fee system denied
some candidates and some voters equal protection of law).
104. See Belitskus v. Pizzingrilli, 343 F.3d 632, 650-51 (3d Cir. 2003) (acknowledging constitutional problems with Pennsylvania's filing fee requirement, but failing to strike filing fee requirement down as constitutionally invalid).
105. See Lubin v. Panish, 415 U.S. 709, 718 (1974) (concluding that California
could not require candidates to pay filing fees they could not afford because such
requirement violated Constitution).
106. See id. at 710 (noting that under California's election code, candidates
for office had to pay either one percent or two percent of salary of office sought to
be placed on primary election ballot).
107. See id. (discussing factual background).
108. Id. at 715 n.4 (referring to large filing fees held to be unconstitutional in
Bullock). According to Mark R. Brown, Bullock and Lubin established that three
specific categories of filing fees exist. See Brown, supra note 5, at 1295 (discussing
constitutional limits pertaining to filing fees). There are patently exclusionary
fees, such as those that were at issue in Bullock, administrative fees and fees that fall
between these two extremes, such as the fee that was at issue in Lubin. See id.
(discussing constitutional limits pertaining to filing fees).
109. See Lubin, 415 U.S. at 718 (concluding that California's filing fee system
was not consistent with constitutional standards).
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Specifically, the Court determined that requiring filing fees without providing any alternative method of access, such as a voter signature requirement, is not reasonably necessary for legitimate state interests. 110 The
Third Circuit should, therefore, have employed this same reasoning to
strike down the Pennsylvania filing fee statute instead of shifting the responsibility to the state legislature."'
VI.

IMPACT OF THE THIRD CIRCUIT'S DECISION

The Third Circuit's determination that the district court's injunction
should have enjoined the state from enforcing the filing fee requirement
against only Stith and Linzey in November of 2000 and in all future elections where they again demonstrate that they will suffer financial hardship
will indirectly open the floodgates for future litigation regarding the equal
protection problems raised by these filing fees. 1 2 Because the Third Circuit failed to invalidate Pennsylvania's ballot access scheme despite its acknowledgement that the state's election code does not conform with the
principles set forth in Bullock and Lubin, the door is left wide open for
future candidates to challenge the law's application to them. I" 3 Lower
courts are left with the daunting task of examining each individual who
comes forward claiming that the she would suffer undue hardship if
forced to pay the state's filing fee without any clear guidelines for how to
properly evaluate these individuals.1 1 4 Further, Pennsylvania still possesses "an election structure that is fundamentally flawed and will inevitably fail to pass constitutional muster as applied to a certain percentage of
candidates."1 15 Some indigent candidates, however, may not challenge
the application of the mandatory fees due to the expenses and burdens
incurred in doing so, and thus such persons are denied the opportunity to
run for office. 11 6 Consequently, some voters will not have the opportunity
110. See id. (holding that if states utilize filing fee systems, they must provide
candidates with alternative means of ballot access).
111. See Belitskus v. Pizzingrilli, 343 F.3d 632, 650 (3d Cir. 2003) (stating that
problems created by Pennsylvania's filing fee system should be addressed by state
legislature instead of courts).
112. See id. (holding that district court's injunction was overly broad).
113. See id. at 651 (acknowledging that after this decision there will continue
to be "case-by-case litigation of the Commonwealth's attempts to collect filing fees
from indigent candidates").
114. See Nathaniel Persily, Candidates v. Parties: The ConstitutionalConstraints on
Primary Ballot Access Laws, 89 GEo. L.J. 2181, 2225 (2001) (acknowledging that ballot access cases raise complicated constitutional concerns because "[d]rawing
bright constitutional lines to demarcate the rights and legitimate interests of each
player in the litigation is an impossible task").
115. Belitskus, 343 F.3d at 650-51 (discussing problems created by Pennsylvania's filing fee system).
116. See Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 149 (1972) (noting that filing fees
lead to exclusion of candidates).
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to vote for their preferred candidate. 1 17 Thus, the court's refusal to ruleon the overall constitutionality of Pennsylvania's mandatory filing fee allows the state to continue operating an electoral system that perpetuates
inequalities in violation of the Equal Protection Clause by failing to provide candidates with a reasonable alternative method for ballot access.' I
LaurenJean McCloskey

117. See id. (noting that filing fees deny voters opportunity to vote for their
preferred candidates).
118. See Brown, supra note 5, at 1287 (arguing that ballot access restrictions,
especially filing fees, raise equal protection problems by treating wealthy candidates differently from less wealthy candidates).
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